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Assigning Error to Viar v. North Carolina Department of
Transportation and State v. Hart: A Proposal for Revision of
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure*
On June 12, 1997, three sisters were traveling south on Interstate
Highway 85 ("1-85") in Rowan County, North Carolina, in a car
driven by Melissa Viar.' Perhaps due to the extremely heavy rainfall
that evening, Melissa lost control of the car and collided with another
southbound vehicle.2 The car then careened across the grass median
separating 1-85's northbound and southbound lanes, and was
broadsided by a northbound tractor-trailer.3 Melissa was seriously
injured in the accident; the car's passengers, Megan and Macey Viar,
were killed instantly.'
The following year, Claude Viar, the girls' father, brought suit
against the North Carolina Department of Transportation, alleging
that the agency had been negligent in failing to install a barrier
between the north- and southbound lanes along that stretch of 1-85,
and that this omission had proximately caused his daughters' deaths.'
The North Carolina Industrial Commission denied his claim,
concluding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate negligence on the
part of the Department of Transportation.' On appeal, however, a
divided North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
Industrial Commission had failed to apply the proper test for claims
of negligent omission, and that the commission's findings of fact were
insufficient to support its conclusion that the Department of
Transportation had not been negligent.7
The Department of Transportation appealed that decision, and
in April 2005, the Supreme Court of North Carolina filed a per
curiam opinion in Viar v. North Carolina Department of
* Copyright © 2007 by Stephen D. Thill.
1. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 162 N.C. App. 362, 363, 590 S.E.2d 909,.911 (2004),
vacated, 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d
662 (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 367, 590 S.E.2d at 914.
4. Id. at 363, 590 S.E.2d at 911.
5. Id. at 363, 590 S.E.2d at 911-12.
6. Id. at 363, 590 S.E.2d at 912.
7. See id. at 376, 590 S.E.2d at 919-20.
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Transportation.8 The state high court concluded that the court of
appeals' majority should never have reached the substantive merits of
the appeal, holding that the court of appeals had erred by invoking
Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure in order
to overlook the fact that the plaintiff-appellant had violated the
appellate rules.9  In vacating the court of appeals' decision and
dismissing the appeal, the supreme court emphasized that "the Rules
of Appellate Procedure must be consistently applied; otherwise, the
Rules become meaningless." Unfortunately, the court of appeals'
adherence to these words, and its application of the appellate rules,
has been characterized by a surprising degree of inconsistency since
the supreme court handed down its decision in Viar." This continues
to be the case even after the more recent decision in State v. Hart,12 in
which the supreme court sought to clarify the law of appellate rules
violations.13 Although such inconsistency would seem to frustrate the
intent with which the court wrote both Viar and Hart, the outcome is
due in large part to the fact that the supreme court itself did not
provide, in either opinion, any particular interpretation of the rules
that "must be consistently applied.' 4 If the Supreme Court of North
Carolina desires consistent application of the appellate rules, it must
articulate a clear standard for determining whether or not rules
violations should result in dismissal of an appeal.15
This Recent Development will analyze the supreme court's Viar
opinion with reference to the decision of the court of appeals to which
it responded, and to the pertinent North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure. It will then demonstrate that application of the appellate
rules by the court of appeals since Viar has failed to achieve the
objective of consistency. Next, it will examine the supreme court's
decision in Hart and attempt to define the implications of that case.
8. 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d
662 (2005).
9. Id. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361.
10. Id.
11. E.g., Broderick v. Broderick, 175 N.C. App. 501, 506, 623 S.E.2d 806, 809 (2006)
(Wynn, J., concurring in the result) ("Although Viar mandates that we consistently apply
our appellate rules, our enforcement of the appellate rules has been anything but
consistent." (citation omitted)).
12. 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201 (2007).
13. Id. at 310-11, 644 S.E.2d at 202.
14. Viar, 359 N.C. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361.
15. This Recent Development acknowledges the standards set forth in Rule 2 of the
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. N.C. R. APP. P. 2. As will be explained,
however, Rule 2 by itself does not provide sufficient guidance as to when it is properly
invoked. See infra text accompanying note 38; infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Given the important questions still left unanswered after Hart, this
Recent Development will then urge the supreme court to exercise the
rulemaking authority conferred upon it by the Constitution of North
Carolina 6 in order to amend the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Those rules should reflect a more definite standard for deciding
whether the appellate division will reach the merits of an appeal.
Pursuant to this recommendation, this piece will identify several
possible solutions to the problem of inconsistency, and briefly weigh
their relative merits and deficiencies. Finally, this Recent
Development will argue that the supreme court should amend the
rules to require the appellate courts, in cases involving rules
violations with regard to assignments of error, 7 to address and decide
upon legal issues that are reasonably identifiable in an appellant's
brief.
Before delving further into the appellate courts' decisions in
Viar, it will be helpful to develop an understanding of the particular
rules at issue. The violations that ultimately resulted in dismissal of
the Viar appellant's case were of rules pertaining to assignments of
error." Rule 10 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure
directs appellants as to how issues are properly presented for review
by the appellate courts.' With regard to Viar, the most important
provisions of Rule 10 are in subsection (c)(1), which specifically
concerns the proper form for assignments of error.2" An appellant's
assignments of error should be concise statements of the legal bases
upon which the appellant will argue that the trial court erred. These
declarations are to be included with the record of the trial that is
submitted to the appellate court on appeal.22 The particular directive
of Rule 10 that caused difficulty in Viar describes the function that
16. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2).
17. This Recent Development focuses on cases involving violations of Rules 10(c) and
28(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, which pertain to assignments
of error. N.C. R. APP. P. 10(c), 28(b). This focus is due primarily to the fact that assigning
error is the context in which the problem of inconsistency has arisen most sharply. That
these particular rules seem to be the most problematic may indicate that they are the most
difficult for parties to understand and to follow. It may also suggest that North Carolina's
appellate courts are more likely to enforce Rules 10(c) and 28(b) than some of their more
formalistic counterparts such as Rule 28(j)(1)(B), which governs type size in briefs. Id.
28(j)(1)(B). Whatever the case, this Recent Development assumes that the enforcement
(or non-enforcement) of the other Rules of Appellate Procedure is consistent, and
therefore satisfactory.
18. Viar, 359 N.C. at 401-02, 610 S.E.2d at 360-61.
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each assignment of error must serve in order to properly present a
legal issue for appeal: "An assignment of error is sufficient if it
directs the attention of the appellate court to the particular error
about which the question is made, with clear and specific record or
transcript references. ' 23  Thus, to strictly comply with Rule 10, an
appellant must make clear to the appellate court the legal bases upon
which the appeal is premised, and include citations to the particular
portions of the record on appeal or trial transcript wherein the
appellant argues that the errors of the trial court are contained.
The other rule that bore heavily on the courts' decisions in Viar
is Rule 2, which gives the appellate courts the ability to suspend the
Rules of Appellate Procedure:
To prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision
in the public interest, either court of the appellate division may,
except as otherwise expressly provided by these rules, suspend
or vary the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a
case pending before it upon application of a party or upon its
own initiative, and may order proceedings in accordance with
its directions.24
Having established some familiarity with the rules at issue, it
should be easier to see the reason for disagreement in Viar. Claude
Viar, the appellant in that case, failed to number his assignments of
error and also neglected to provide specific transcript or record
references in conjunction with those assignments.2 ' Both of these
oversights constitute violations of Rule 10(c)(1). 26  Despite these
violations, a majority of the court of appeals elected to reach the
merits of the appeal. The court recognized the appellant's rules
violations,27  and even cited court of appeals precedent in
acknowledging that proper assignments of error are crucial in
informing both the court and the appellee of the grounds for an
appeal.28  The court also took note of Judge Tyson's dissenting
opinion, in which he stated that the rules violations should result in
23. Id.
24. Id. 2.
25. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 401, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (per curiam),
reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).
26. N.C. R. APP. P. 10(c)(1).
27. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 162 N.C. App. 362, 375, 590 S.E.2d 909, 919 (2004),
vacated, 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d
662 (2005).
28. Id. (citing Shook v. County of Buncombe, 125 N.C. App. 284, 286, 480 S.E.2d 706,
707 (1997) (dismissing an appeal for rules violations where the appellant's brief presented
numerous complicated issues, and where the record on appeal was extremely lengthy)).
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dismissal of the appeal. 29 Nevertheless, the court distinguished the
case before it from the precedent upon which Judge Tyson relied:
In this case, the dissenting opinion does not assert that the rules
violations by plaintiff impede comprehension of the issues on
appeal by the appellee or this Court, or that the appellate
process has been otherwise frustrated. Nor does the record
support such a conclusion. Unlike [Shook v. County of
Buncombe], the record here is not lengthy, nor are the issues
complicated. The violations are technical rather than
substantive, and are not so egregious as to warrant dismissal. °
Since it was able to discern the legal issues presented in the
appeal despite the appellant's rules violations, and because it believed
that dismissal of the appeal "would amount to a manifest injustice,"
the majority invoked Rule 2 to suspend the rules.31 The court then
held in favor of the appellant, remanding the case for further
consideration by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.32
The fact that Judge Tyson filed a dissent in the case enabled the
Department of Transportation to appeal the court of appeals'
holding,33 and thus Viar reached the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. The supreme court began its relatively brief opinion by
stating: "The North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure are
mandatory and 'failure to follow these rules will subject an appeal to
dismissal.' "I' Then, after cataloging the procedural errors committed
by the appellant at the intermediate level, the supreme court stated
that the court of appeals, in reaching the merits of the case, had
impermissibly addressed an issue not raised by the appellant.35 The
court acknowledged the court of appeals' reasoning for deciding the
case on its merits, but said: "The Court of Appeals majority asserted
that plaintiff's Rules violations did not impede comprehension of the
issues on appeal or frustrate the appellate process. It is not the role
of the appellate courts, however, to create an appeal for an
29. Id.
30. Id. (referring to Shook, 125 N.C. App. at 286, 480 S.E.2d at 707).
31. Id. at 375-76, 590 S.E.2d at 919-20.
32. Id. at 376, 590 S.E.2d at 919-20; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (2005) ("[A]n appeal lies of right to the Supreme
Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case... [i]n which there is
a dissent.").
34. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 401,610 S.E.2d 360, 360 (per curiam),
reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005) (quoting Steingress v. Steingress, 350
N.C. 64, 65,511 S.E.2d 298, 99 (1999)).
35. Id. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361.
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appellant."36 The court then concluded: "As this case illustrates, the
Rules of Appellate Procedure must be consistently applied;
otherwise, the Rules become meaningless, and an appellee is left
without notice of the basis upon which an appellate court might
rule."37
The supreme court's basic message to the court of appeals in
Viar is clear enough: the Rules of Appellate Procedure are to be
applied consistently, and Rule 2 is not to be invoked in order to
consider issues not raised by the appellants themselves. However, a
review of cases decided by the court of appeals since the supreme
court issued Viar reveals that consistency is difficult to achieve in the
absence of a more readily articulable standard as to when Rule 2
should be invoked. The words of Rule 2 itself38 provide the courts
with little concrete guidance: terms such as "manifest injustice" and
"the public interest" are not self-defining and fail to set forth legal
standards that are easy to apply. Likewise, it is not clear what it
means to "create an appeal for an appellant."39  Thus, even after
seemingly specific instructions from the supreme court, the court of
appeals has applied the Rules of Appellate Procedure inconsistently
since Viar.
Some recent decisions of the court of appeals, for instance, have
read Viar to mean that violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
are not to be excused, "even in instances where a party's Rules
violations neither impede comprehension of the issues on appeal nor
frustrate the appellate process."'  In Consolidated Electrical
Distributors, Inc. v. Dorsey,41 the court of appeals dismissed an appeal
due to multiple rules violations, which included failure to comply with
Rule 10(c).42 The appellant in Dorsey also violated Rule 28(b)(6),
which instructs appellants, inter alia, how to make proper references
to their assignments of error in their briefs.43 In dismissing the case,
36. Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id.
38. See supra text accompanying note 24.
39. See Viar, 359 N.C. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361.
40. Consol. Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Dorsey, 170 N.C. App. 684, 688, 613 S.E.2d 518, 521
(2005) (Wynn, J., concurring).
41. 170 N.C. App. 684, 613 S.E.2d 518 (2005). The appellant in Dorsey argued that
the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment on a breach of contract claim. Id.
at 685-86, 613 S.E.2d at 519-20.
42. Id. at 687, 613 S.E.2d at 520-21. The appellant violated Rule 10(c) by failing to
separately number his assignments of error. Id. at 687, 613 S.E.2d at 520.
43. Rule 28(b)(6) reads, in pertinent part:
[Vol. 851804
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the majority opinion made no mention of whether or not the rules
violations had made it difficult for the court to determine the issues
upon which the appellant sought the court's judgment, and took no
account of the particular circumstances of the appellant." In a
concurring opinion, however, Judge Wynn indicated that the court
could have discerned the issues raised by the appellant.45 He also
conveyed particular "displeasure" with so strict an application of the
rules to the case at hand, due to the fact that the party whose appeal
was being dismissed was a pro se appellant.46 Dismissal, he wrote,
was largely the result of "the dictates of Viar."47
It was likewise on the basis of the supreme court's ruling in Viar
that an issue was deemed to be improperly before the court of
appeals in the parental rights case In re A.E.4" There, the appellant
father provided the court of appeals with only a single assignment of
error, generally challenging the trial court's finding that his children
Immediately following each question shall be a reference to the assignments of
error pertinent to the question, identified by their numbers and by the pages at
which they appear in the printed record on appeal. Assignments of error not set
out in the appellant's brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated
or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.
N.C. R. APP. P. 28(b)(6). The court of appeals in Dorsey found multiple violations of Rule
28, only one of which related to assignments of error: the appellant failed to make proper
references to his assignments of error in his brief. Dorsey, 170 N.C. App. at 686, 613
S.E.2d at 520 (citing N.C. R. APP. P. 28(b)(6)). The appellant also violated Rule 28 by
failing to separate the questions presented in his brief, to cite sufficient authority in
support of his arguments, and to give a complete statement of the facts of the case. Id. at
686-87, 613 S.E.2d at 520 (citing N.C. R. APP. P. 28(b)(5), (6)). It is thus worth noting that
violations pertaining to assignments of error were not the only bases for dismissal. The
important point to take from Dorsey for purposes of this Recent Development, however,
is Judge Wynn's indication that none of these errors rendered the appellant's arguments
unclear, and that the case was really being dismissed because of the supreme court's
holding in Viar. Id. at 688, 613 S.E.2d at 521 (Wynn, J., concurring).
44. See Dorsey, 170 N.C. App. at 686-87, 613 S.E.2d at 520-21.
45. Id. at 688, 613 S.E.2d at 521 (Wynn, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 687, 613 S.E.2d at 521.
47. Id. at 688, 613 S.E.2d at 521.
48. 171 N.C. App. 675,680, 615 S.E.2d 53, 57 (2005). In re A.E. involved an appellant
father's challenge to the reliability of certain expert testimony admitted at trial. Id. at 675,
615 S.E.2d at 54. It should be noted that the appellant's violation of Rule 10(c)(1) was not
the only ground for the court of appeals' disposition of the case. The court also held that
the evidentiary issue was not properly presented because the appellant had not objected to
the challenged testimony at trial, and thus had failed to preserve the issue for appellate
review under Rule 10(b)(1). Id. at 679, 615 S.E.2d at 56 (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1)).
Preservation of issues under Rule 10(b)(1) is beyond the scope of this Recent
Development. For present purposes, it is sufficient to point out that the court of appeals
in In re A.E. did not indicate that its holding was contingent upon the Rule 10(b)(1)
violation. See id.
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had been neglected.49 In his brief, however, the appellant argued that
certain testimony admitted at trial was not competent evidence to
support the adjudication of neglect. 5  The majority of the court of
appeals was apparently unconcerned with the degree to which the
appellant's brief clarified his legal argument and directed the court to
the trial proceedings upon which the appeal was based.5 Instead, the
court focused on the appellant's failure to achieve strict compliance
with Rule 10(c)(1), noting that his assignment of error did not
specifically refer to the challenged testimony.52 The court then drew
directly upon Viar, stating that the supreme court's opinion prevented
the court of appeals from addressing an issue "not raised or argued by
the appellant. ' 53 In closing, the majority added: "Just as 'the Rules of
Appellate Procedure must be consistently applied,' so too the
principles in Viar must be consistently applied. '54 Despite this latest
call for consistency, Judge Tyson, evidently able to discern the
appellant's argument with regard to the disputed testimony, dissented
in part and expressed his opinion that the court should have not only
decided the appeal upon its merits, but also reversed the order of the
trial court.
With cases such as these giving rise to uneasy concurrences and
even vigorous dissents, it should come as little surprise that a
substantial number of cases decided by the court of appeals since Viar
have actually come out the other way. That is, there have been
numerous cases in which appellants have violated the Rules of
Appellate Procedure relating to assignments of error, and yet the
court of appeals has elected to reach the merits of the appeal. In
Youse v. Duke Energy Corp.,56 the majority opinion listed eight
alleged violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, several of
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 680, 615 S.E.2d at 57 (noting that the evidentiary challenge was, in fact,
clarified in the appellant's brief).
52. Id.
53. Id. It is curious that the court of appeals would refer to the evidentiary issue as
one "not raised or argued by the appellant," since the court itself observed that the issue
was argued in the appellant's brief. Id.
54. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402,
610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643,617 S.E.2d 662 (2005)).
55. See id. at 685-86, 615 S.E.2d at 60 (Tyson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
56. 171 N.C. App. 187, 614 S.E.2d 396 (2005). Youse involved allegations of wrongful
termination, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of North Carolina's
Wage and Hour Act. Id. at 190, 614 S.E.2d at 399.
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which pertained to assignments of error.5 7 Although these violations
were comparable to those that provoked dismissal in Dorsey and In re
A.E.,58 in this instance the court invoked Rule 2 to reach the merits of
the appeal: "Despite the Rules violations, we are able to determine
the issues in this case on appeal. Furthermore, we note that
defendant, in filing a brief that thoroughly responds to plaintiff's
arguments on appeal, was put on sufficient notice of the issues on
appeal."59 The court even cited to the supreme court's Viar opinion
in invoking Rule 2, interpreting the supreme court's statement that
inconsistent application of the rules leaves an appellee "without
notice of the basis upon which an appellate court might rule"60 to
mean that as long as the appellee has such notice, an appeal need not
be dismissed.61
The court of appeals has subsequently used the same reasoning
to justify suspension of the rules for assigning error in several cases.
In Davis v. Columbus County Schools,62 the court of appeals invoked
Rule 2 despite the fact that the appellants' assignments of error
violated Rule 10(c)(1) by failing to direct the court to the exact bases
of the appellants' arguments.63 The court stated that it had "no
trouble discerning" what the appellants were challenging, and
distinguished the errors in the case before it as less severe than those
committed by the appellant in Viar.6 The court then quoted from
Youse, drawing on that case for the proposition that an appeal should
not be dismissed if the court can determine the issues on appeal in
spite of rules violations.65 The court of appeals again held Viar to be
57. Id. at 191, 614 S.E.2d at 400. The court of appeals seemed to agree with the
appellee's contention that the appellant violated Rule 28(b)(6) by "failing to reference the
record page numbers on which her assignments of error appear," and by referencing the
incorrect assignment of error in support of one of her arguments. See id.
58. See supra notes 41-43, 48-52 and accompanying text.
59. Youse, 171 N.C. App. at 192, 614 S.E.2d at 400.
60. Viar v. N.C. Dep't. of Transp., 359 N.C. App. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (per
curiam), reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).
61. See Youse, 171 N.C. App. at 192, 614 S.E.2d at 400.
62. 175 N.C. App. 95, 622 S.E.2d 671 (2005). Davis was an appeal from a workers'
compensation award granted by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Id. at 95, 622
S.E.2d at 672.
63. Id. at 97-98, 622 S.E.2d at 674. The appellant submitted three assignments of
error, the first two of which failed to state any legal basis for appeal. See id. at 97, 622
S.E.2d at 673. The third assignment of error did make the legal assertion that the
Industrial Commission's decision was unsupported by competent evidence, but, standing
alone, failed to assign error to any specific findings or conclusions. See id. at 97, 622
S.E.2d at 674.
64. Id. at 97-98, 622 S.E.2d at 674.
65. Id. at 98, 622 S.E.2d at 674.
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of limited applicability in Welch Contracting, Inc. v. North Carolina
Department of Transportation.66 There, the court noted that the
appellant's brief had violated Rules 10 and 28,67 but nonetheless
reached the merits of the appeal because the appellees "had sufficient
notice of the basis upon which our Court might rule"68 and therefore
"were not prejudiced by [the appellant's] error."69
The fact that the court of appeals cited Viar in rendering its
decision in every one of the cases just described-both those that
dismissed appeals for rules violations7" and those that pardoned
similar violations"T-demonstrates that the court of appeals is well
aware of Viar and its instructions. The problem is that various
interpretations by the court of appeals have rendered the scope of
those instructions every bit as ambiguous as the scope of Rule 2.72
More recently, the Supreme Court of North Carolina attempted to
clear up the uncertainty that has prevailed since Viar with its opinion
in State v. Hart.
73
According to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the appellant
in Hart had violated Rule 10(c)(1). 7' Reading Viar to mean that it
would therefore be impermissible to reach the merits, the court of
appeals dismissed several of the appellant's arguments. 7 As was the
66. 175 N.C. App. 45, 49-50, 622 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2005). Welch followed from a suit
by a subcontractor for, inter alia, breach of contract and improper bidding practices. Id. at
47-48, 622 S.E.2d at 693.
67. Id. at 49, 622 S.E.2d at 693-94. The appellant's sole assignment of error was that
the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment in the appellee's favor. Id. at 48,
622 S.E.2d at 693. In fact, the trial court had granted the appellee's motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Though the appellant's brief properly focused on
subject matter jurisdiction, the appellant was in violation of Rules 10 and 28 due to the
lack of correspondence between the assignment of error and the question presented in the
appellant's brief. Id. at 48-49, 622 S.E.2d at 693-94 (citing N.C. R. APP. P. 10(c)(1),
28(b)(6)).
68. Id. at 49, S.E.2d at 694.
69. Id. at 50, S.E.2d at 694.
70. In re A.E., 171 N.C. App. 675, 680, 615 S.E.2d 53, 57 (2005); Consol. Elec.
Distribs., Inc. v. Dorsey, 170 N.C. App. 684, 687, 613 S.E.2d 518, 520-21 (2005).
71. Davis v. Columbus County Sch., 175 N.C. App. 95, 98, 622 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2005);
Welch Contracting, 175 N.C. App. at 49, 622 S.E.2d at 694; Youse v. Duke Energy Corp.,
171 N.C. App. 187, 192, 614 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2005).
72. See supra text accompanying note 38; infra note 24 and accompanying text.
73. 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201 (2007). The supreme court in Hart acknowledged
that it was endeavoring "to correct the misapplication of our Viar decision." Id. at 311,
644 S.E.2d at 202.
74. State v. Hart, 179 N.C. App. 30, 36-37, 633 S.E.2d 102, 106-07, discretionary
review denied, 360 N.C. 651, 637 S.E.2d 182 (2006), affd in part, rev'd in part, 361 N.C. 309,
644 S.E.2d 201 (2007). For a more detailed discussion of the facts and proceedings in Hart,
see infra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
75. See id. at 36-39, 633 S.E.2d at 106-08.
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case for the appellee in Viar,6 however, the appellant in Hart was able
to appeal as of right to the supreme court on the basis of a dissenting
opinion at the court of appeals levelY. After summarizing the facts of
the case and the opinions issued by the court of appeals, the supreme
court in Hart made a point of noting that the State of North Carolina,
the appellee before the court of appeals, had not actually raised the
issue of the appellant's rules violations."8 Rather, the court of appeals
had taken those violations into consideration on its own initiative.79
The supreme court clarified that the court of appeals was under no
requirement to do so,' perhaps implying that the court of appeals has
been overly concerned with procedural matters since Viar. It is
noteworthy, however, that the supreme court neither prohibited the
court of appeals from sua sponte consideration of the rules, nor said
anything to preclude parties from pointing out each other's
procedural faults.8 This observation becomes more significant as one
continues to consider the effects of the supreme court's decision in
Hart.8
The supreme court went on to clarify the meaning of some of
its more recent opinions regarding appellate rules violations. Though
the court reaffirmed that the rules " 'are mandatory and not
directory,' ,,.. and that violation of the rules " 'will subject an appeal
to dismissal,' "' it also explained that these statements do not
mandate that all violations of the rules must inevitably result in
dismissal of the appeal: "Rather, 'subject to' means that dismissal is
one possible sanction. ' The supreme court also sought to define the
implications of its opinion in Viar, and in doing so repudiated one
reading of that decision that the court of appeals has occasionally
applied. The supreme court asserted that its Viar opinion did not
76. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (2005) ("[Ain appeal lies of right to the Supreme
Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case ... [i]n which there is
a dissent."); State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 310, 644 S.E.2d 201, 202 (2007); see also N.C. R.
APP. P. 16(b) (limiting the scope of supreme court review in appeals based solely on the
existence of a dissent in the court of appeals to issues "specifically set out in the dissenting
opinion as the basis for that dissent").




82. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
83. Hart, 361 N.C. at 311, 644 S.E.2d at 202 (quoting Reep v. Beck, 360 N.C. 34, 38,
619 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2005)).
84. Id. (quoting Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 65, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299 (1999)).
85. Id. at 313, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
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direct the court of appeals to avoid invoking Rule 2 altogether. 6 The
true holding of Viar, the Hart court declared, is that the court of
appeals may not invoke Rule 2 in order to address issues "not raised
or argued" by an appellant.87 In other words, Viar merely prohibits
the appellate courts from "creat[ing] an appeal for the appellant. ' 88
It is important to understand the distinction the supreme court
drew in elucidating the meaning of Viar. When the court of appeals
elected to ignore the appellant's procedural violations and reach the
merits in Viar, it partially justified its choice on the grounds that the
violations did not "impede comprehension of the issues on appeal" or
"otherwise frustrate[]" the appellate process.89 According to the
supreme court in Hart, when the high court rejected this reasoning in
Viar, it did not hold that all violations must result in dismissal
regardless of whether the court can discern the issues presented. 9°
Instead, the Viar court held that the court of appeals' ability to
perceive the issues could not justify invoking Rule 2 where the court
of appeals then "created an appeal for the appellant" by addressing
issues "not raised or argued."9'
It is not difficult to envision circumstances in which this
distinction would be useful. Imagine, for example, a case in which an
appellant's only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by
failing to hold the appellee liable for negligence. Imagine further that
the appellant commits some violation of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure. What is absolutely clear following the supreme
court's opinion in Hart is that the court of appeals in this hypothetical
could not permissibly invoke Rule 2 to excuse that violation, and then
go on to decide the appeal on the basis of a question plainly not
86. Id. at 312, 644 S.E.2d at 203. The Hart court specifically rejected the
interpretation of Viar put forth by the court of appeals in State v. Buchanan, 170 N.C.
App. 692, 613 S.E.2d 356 (2005). Hart, 361 N.C. at 312, 644 S.E.2d at 203. In Buchanan,
the court of appeals stated that the supreme court in Viar had "admonished [the court of
appeals] to avoid applying Rule 2." Buchanan, 170 N.C. App. at 693, 613 S.E.2d at 356.
The Hart court disavowed this reading as a "misappli[cation]" of Viar. Hart, 361 N.C. at
312, 644 S.E.2d at 203. This erroneous reading of Viar apparently also affected the court
of appeals' decision in Broderick v. Broderick, 175 N.C. App. 501, 623 S.E.2d 806 (2006),:
"[In Viar, our Supreme Court admonished this Court for applying Rule 2 ... " id. at 506,
623 S.E.2d at 809. For more on Broderick, see infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
87. Hart, 361 N.C. at 313, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
88. Id.
89. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 162 N.C. App. 362, 375, 590 S.E.2d 909, 919 (2004),
vacated, 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d
662 (2005).
90. Hart, 361 N.C. at 312-13, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
91. Id.
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raised or argued by the appellant, such as breach of contract.' Even
though the court of appeals may understand that the contract issue
would have been a more fruitful basis on which to appeal, Viar would
require the court to ignore-or "dismiss," as it were-the contract
issue.93
What is difficult to imagine, however, is that such a shameless
and unambiguous case of the court of appeals "creating an appeal for
an appellant" would ever arise. In reality, the recent cases in which
the court of appeals has debated whether or not to dismiss due to
rules violations have been ones in which some portion of the court
seemed honestly able to understand the issues presented on appeal,
based entirely on the materials that the appellant presented to the
court. 94 For that to be the case, one would expect some degree of
correlation between the appellant's assignments of error, the
arguments actually presented in that party's brief, and the questions
that might be taken up by the court itself. Indeed, this assumption is
borne out by the cases. In Viar, for instance, the key question was
whether the court of appeals could permissibly consider the issue of
reasonableness, where the appellant argued more generally that the
trial court had erred in failing to hold the appellee liable for
negligence. 9 Similarly, the court of appeals in Hart was unable to
come to a consensus as to whether it would violate Viar by
considering questions that were presented with greater legal
specificity in the appellant's brief than they were in the assignments
of error. 6  Even acknowledging the technical violations of the
appellate rules in these two cases, one must seriously question the
accuracy of accusing a judge who would reach the merits on such facts
of attempting to "create an appeal." 97
No judge on the court of appeals has argued that the appellate
courts ought to be able to consider issues that clearly have not been
92. Id. at 313, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
93. Id. at 312-13, 644 S.E.2d at 203. Presumably, such an obvious attempt to "create
an appeal for the appellant" would be impermissible regardless of whether the appellant
had violated the appellate rules. The supreme court's elucidation of this point thus does
little to clarify matters in the particular context of rules violations.
94. See, e.g., supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text; infra notes 166-69 and
accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
97. Similarly, it would be hyperbole to suggest that a judge opting to consider the
issue of negligence in Viar, or the questions fully presented in the appellant's brief in Hart,
would be addressing questions "not raised or argued" by the appellant. Hart, 361 N.C. at
313, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
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raised or argued by an appellant.98 Rather, the court of appeals has
struggled with the question of what constitutes a sufficient correlation
between the assignments of error, the brief, and the legal question the
court understands it is being asked to answer, such that the court
should elect to reach the merits of the appeal. Put simply, the court
of appeals has understandably found it difficult to define the outer
margins of what it means to "create an appeal for an appellant." 9
Given this problem, and because the close cases involving violations
of the rules for assigning error will call on the court of appeals to give
definition to those very margins, the Hart court's simple reaffirmation
of this language as the prevailing standard is not very helpful. In the
typical case in which the "creating an appeal" standard is applied, the
distinction drawn by the supreme court in Hart-between a court's
ability to discern the issues on appeal on the one hand, and "creating
an appeal for an appellant" on the other-will be one without any
clear difference. Like the "creating an appeal" standard itself, that
distinction is therefore of dubious utility.
After clarifying that dismissal is not necessarily required
whenever the slightest rules violation has been committed, the
supreme court in Hart attempted to delineate when it is permissible
for the appellate courts to invoke Rule 2 in order to suspend the
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cautioned that Rule 2 is to
be applied carefully and in limited circumstances, quoting the
commentary of the committee that drafted the rule for the assertion
that "Rule 2 'expresses an obvious residual power possessed by any
authoritative rule-making body to suspend or vary operation of its
published rules in specific cases where this is necessary to accomplish a
fundamental purpose of the rules.' "'0o The court failed, however, to
offer any definitive statement of what might qualify as such a
98. In Broderick v. Broderick, 175 N.C. App. 501, 623 S.E.2d 806 (2006), Judge Wynn
proposed in his concurring opinion that the supreme court "abolish assignments of error"
altogether, i. at 503, 623 S.E.2d at 807 (Wynn, J., concurring in the result). This does not
amount to an argument in favor of removing all limits on the scope of review, however. In
fact, Judge Wynn specifically acknowledged that assignments of error are intended to
identify issues that are actually "before the court." Id. at 505, 623 S.E.2d at 808. He
simply declared his belief that the purposes of assignments of error "can be achieved
through other means." Id. For more on Broderick and Judge Wynn's proposal, see infra
notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
99. The inconsistency of the court of appeals' handling of rules violations in the wake
of Viar amply demonstrates this difficulty. See supra notes 40-72 and accompanying text.
100. Hart, 361 N.C. at 316, 644 S.E.2d at 205 (emphasis in original) (quoting N.C. R.
APP. P. 2 cmt. (1975), reprinted in 287 N.C. 671, 680 (1975)).
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"fundamental purpose," and instead simply emphasized that "the
greater object of the rules" will rarely be at stake."'
The court did provide some guidance regarding fundamental
purposes, in the form of references to past cases in which the supreme
court has invoked Rule 2 in order to protect "substantial rights of an
appellant."'' 2 Presumably, then, protection of "substantial rights" is
one fundamental purpose of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Ultimately, however, the tenor of the court's words is cautionary.
Although the court cited a number of cases in which it has found
invocation of Rule 2 to be proper, its emphasis was on the assertion
that "Rule 2 should only be used in 'exceptional circumstances.' ,,03
Upon reading these words of warning, one cannot help but
notice the inconsistency of the supreme court's tone within its Hart
opinion. As already noted, the court began by stating in no uncertain
terms that dismissal of an appeal is not required in every instance in
which the Rules of Appellate Procedure are violated.'0 What this
means is that Rule 2 is alive and well, a realization that has led some
to speculate that "the Court of Appeals in the future is likely to be
more flexible in dealing with appellate rule violations."'0'5  This
outlook seems to ignore the latter portion of the supreme court's
opinion, however, in which the high court instructed the court of
appeals to exercise Rule 2 only in rare cases. Though the Hart
opinion begins by reviving Rule 2, it concludes by confining the rule's
applicability within a very narrow range. The assumption that the
court of appeals will be more flexible regarding rules violations might
therefore be true only to the extent the court previously interpreted
the supreme court's Viar opinion to mean that any violation must
result in automatic dismissal.' °6
The court of appeals can now rest assured that such a broad
reading of Viar is incorrect; but this does not mean that the appellate
rules can now be freely suspended, for the Rule 2 inquiry does not
101. Id.
102. Id. at 316-17, 644 S.E.2d at 205 (citing seven cases).
103. Id. at 316, 644 S.E.2d at 205 (quoting Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 66, 511
S.E.2d 298, 299 (1999)).
104. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
105. Guy Loranger, Supreme Court: Errors Don't Mean Automatic Dismissal, N.C.
LAW. WKLY. (Raleigh), May 14, 2007, at 1.
106. Whether or not Hart actually affords the court of appeals greater flexibility when
confronted with rules violations depends upon how Hart is properly to be interpreted. For
a discussion of possible readings of Hart, see infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
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stop there.'" If the appellate rules have been violated in a manner
that does not require the court of appeals to "create an appeal for the
appellant," the court may still have to decide whether it would be
proper to invoke Rule 2 by determining whether a fundamental
purpose of the appellate rules is in the balance." Given the supreme
court's emphasis of the view that fundamental purposes are rarely at
stake, it is likely that the court of appeals will actually exercise Rule 2
discretion less frequently now than it did prior to the supreme court's
decision in Hart. After all, certain panels of the court of appeals were
willing, before Hart, to invoke Rule 2 as long as the issues on appeal
were understandable." In light of the supreme court's admonitions
in Hart, one should expect the court of appeals to be more hesitant to
conclude that a case implicates a fundamental purpose of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure than the court would be to declare merely that
the issues on appeal are discernable.
Put another way, it would be easier for an appellee to convince a
court that no fundamental purpose is at stake than it would be to
convince the court that the issues raised by the appellant cannot be
understood. Since nothing in Hart precludes parties from drawing
attention to each other's rules violations, and since it is quite possible
to read Hart to mean that dismissal is required whenever the rules are
violated and there is no fundamental purpose at stake,10 attorneys
might seize upon this opportunity by being more vigilant than ever
before in policing opposing parties' adherence to the rules. After all,
under such a reading of Hart, all that would stand between an
appellee and a successful motion to dismiss once a violation is found
would be to convince the court that no fundamental purposes of the
107. Hart, 361 N.C. at 315, 644 S.E.2d at 205 (noting that although the court of appeals
still has authority to invoke Rule 2, the rule must be applied with caution).
108. Again, whether or not a full Rule 2 inquiry would be necessary on these facts
depends upon the proper interpretation of the supreme court's opinion in Hart. For a
discussion of possible readings of Hart, see infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
109. E.g., Davis v. Columbus County Sch., 175 N.C. App. 95, 97-98, 622 S.E.2d 671,674
(2005) (reaching the merits despite violations where the court had "no trouble discerning"
the basis of the appeal); Youse v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 N.C. App. 187, 192, 614 S.E.2d
396, 400 (2005) (reaching the merits despite violations where both the court and the
appellee were able to determine the issues on appeal).
110. Whether this is the proper reading depends upon whether it is always necessary to
invoke Rule 2 in order to reach the merits of an appeal that has violated the appellate
rules. The supreme court noted in Hart that the Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for
sanctions less severe than dismissal, Hart, 361 N.C. at 311, 644 S.E.2d at 202, but the
question remains whether an appellate court may impose some lesser form of sanction,
and then proceed to consider the merits without conducting any fundamental purpose
inquiry. For discussion of the possible answers to that question, see infra notes 113-17 and
accompanying text.
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rules are implicated. Thus, the supreme court's reminder in Hart that
the court of appeals is not required to seek out procedural violations
on its own initiative may do little to decrease the number of appeals
decided on procedural grounds. Moreover, the stringent fundamental
purpose standard may mean that Hart has done little to enhance the
court of appeals' flexibility in deciding how to impose sanctions for
rules violations. " '
However one chooses to interpret Hart, one sure effect of the
opinion is that the propriety of invoking Rule 2 will depend upon the
fundamental purpose inquiry in most cases."' As discussed above, it
is therefore likely that Rule 2 will now be applied less often than it
was prior to Hart. The question, then, is whether there is any way for
the appellate courts to reach the merits of an appeal without invoking
Rule 2. Hart unfortunately does not offer any definitive answer to
this question. One plausible reading of Hart in this regard has
already been noted."3 A second possible interpretation of the case is
that the Rule 2 inquiry is not always necessitated by rules violations.
In the course of establishing that dismissal is not required in every
case of rules violations, the supreme court noted in Hart that the
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure themselves provide for
other forms of penalties against parties who commit violations."'
Rules 25(b) and 34, the court pointed out, enable the appellate courts
to levy sanctions against parties for failure to comply with the
111. Hart explicitly repudiates the notion that any violation of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure must result in automatic dismissal. Hart, 361 N.C. at 313, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
However, if Rule 2 provides the only means of reaching the merits of an appeal in which
the rules have been violated, and if Rule 2 is to be invoked as seldom as the supreme court
indicated in Hart, id. at 315-16, 644 S.E.2d at 205, then the results yielded under the Hart
scheme may not be very different from what they would be if all violations resulted in
automatic dismissal. Put simply, only very rarely would a case avoid dismissal once
appellate rules violations have been found.
112. Whether or not an appellate court may invoke Rule 2 will not always turn on the
fundamental purpose inquiry, because the court must dismiss any appeal that would
otherwise require the court to "create an appeal for the appellant," presumably without
regard to fundamental purposes of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Viar v. N.C.
Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (per curiam) ("It is not the role of
the appellate courts ... to create an appeal for an appellant."), reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643,
617 S.E.2d 662 (2005). Similarly, the supreme court held in Munn v. NC. State Univ., 360
N.C. 353, 626 S.E.2d 270 (2006) (per curiam), that the court of appeals should have
dismissed an appeal in which the assignments of error were not accompanied by transcript
or record references, and the appellant had otherwise failed to properly preserve the issue
that the court of appeals considered, Hart, 361 N.C. at 313, 644 S.E.2d at 203. Given that
the supreme court in Munn did not explicitly consider fundamental purpose, this quantum
of rules violations also presumably results in automatic dismissal.
113. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
114. Hart, 361 N.C. at 311,644 S.E.2d at 202.
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appellate rules."' These sanctions can be as severe as dismissal of an
appeal, but they can also come in the form of monetary damages or
simply "any... sanction deemed just and proper. '" 16
By drawing attention to these alternative forms of sanction, the
supreme court may have intended to say that some violations of the
rules (violations that do not require the court to "create an appeal for
the appellant," for starters) warrant something less than dismissal of
the appeal, and that dismissal can be avoided without resorting to
Rule 2 to suspend or vary the rules."7 If this is the proper reading, a
showing that no fundamental purposes of the rules are at stake would
not mandate dismissal (though it may result in some other form of
sanction), and the court of appeals is indeed more flexible in deciding
how to treat rules violations than it would be under a scheme of
automatic dismissal.
115. Id.
116. N.C. R. APP. P. 34. Rule 25(b) enables the appellate courts to impose sanctions
"of the type and in the manner prescribed by Rule 34" for substantial failure to comply
with the appellate rules. Id. 25(b). Rule 34 sets forth the various types of sanctions that
the appellate courts are authorized to impose. Id. 34(b).
117. For example, imagine that a case comes before the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, and the appellate rules have been violated in some way. Rather than dismiss the
case, the court elects to impose some lesser sanction, pursuant to Rule 25(b) and Rule 34.
In order to proceed to the merits of the case, would the court of appeals nonetheless have
to invoke Rule 2 in order to suspend or vary the requirements of the rule that has been
violated? An affirmative answer to this question means that whether or not a North
Carolina appellate court reaches the merits of a flawed appeal will almost always depend
upon a fundamental purpose inquiry. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
A negative answer seems more sensible. If other sanctions are imposed, then the
rules are not being suspended. They are instead being enforced by way of a penalty that is
provided for within the rules themselves. It should be pointed out, however, that Rule 2
enables the appellate courts to "suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of [the
Rules of Appellate Procedure]." N.C. R. APP. P. 2 (emphasis added). One might argue
that reaching the merits of an appeal despite rules violations, though not a complete
suspension due to the sanctions imposed, constitutes at least a variance. Even more
noteworthy is the fact that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has in the recent past
indicated that Rule 2 discretion would have to be exercised in order to reach the merits,
even where lesser sanctions were imposed. In Steingress v. Steingress, 129 N.C. App. 430,
500 S.E.2d 777 (1998), afftd, 350 N.C. 64, 511 S.E.2d 298 (1999), the court of appeals
dismissed an appeal for violations of the appellate rules, Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C.
64, 64, 511 S.E.2d 298, 298 (1999). One judge dissented, however, voting to impose
monetary sanctions and to reach the merits of the appeal. Id. at 67, 511 S.E.2d at 300. In
affirming the court of appeals, the supreme court stated that "the dissenting opinion in this
case presents no dividing issue and is merely a vote in favor of the exercise of discretion to
suspend the rules." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the supreme court in Steingress treated a
vote for other sanctions as a vote in favor of invoking Rule 2. When Hart is read together
with Steingress, the supreme court seems to have indicated that all violations of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure must result in dismissal unless a fundamental purpose of the rules
is at stake.
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It is not possible to simply read the supreme court's opinion in
Hart and know which of these interpretations is correct; though
neither is it necessary to do so for purposes of this Recent
Development. Whether or not Rule 2 is the sole means of reaching
the merits of a procedurally flawed appeal is merely one of several
important questions that the supreme court has not answered. For
example, the meaning of "creating an appeal for an appellant"
remains unclear. Hart clarifies that it is possible to reach the merits
despite rules violations without offending the "creating an appeal"
standard,"' but, despite the difficulty the court of appeals has
encountered in applying that standard since Viar, the opinion
provides no further guidance as to the quantum of rules violations
that should trigger dismissal. Hart also does little to define the
circumstances in which Rule 2 may be invoked. It is clear enough
that Rule 2 should only be applied when a fundamental purpose of
the appellate rules is at stake,"9 but Hart is of little help in
determining what constitutes a fundamental purpose.120 Finally,
although Hart serves as a reminder that dismissal of an appeal is not
the only possible sanction for violation of the rules,'2' the opinion
provides no direction whatsoever regarding the circumstances in
which dismissal would be too severe and lesser sanctions should be
employed. The supreme court said only that "every violation of the
rules does not require dismissal of the appeal or the issue, although
some other sanction may be appropriate, pursuant to Rule 25(b) or
Rule 34.
" 122
Without doubt, there is no easy answer to any of the questions
that linger after Hart. In addition, it is possible that the supreme
court refrained from attempting to answer questions that did not need
to be resolved in order for the court to render a decision regarding
the sole issue that was before it.'2 It should therefore be noted that it
is not the intent of this Recent Development merely to criticize the
supreme court's opinion. The reason for drawing attention to these
unanswered questions is rather to demonstrate that Hart will not
likely spell the end of "two years of automatic dismissals and divided
panels in the Court of Appeals," as some had hoped it would.
118. Hart, 361 N.C. at 312-13, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
119. Id. at 316, 644 S.E.2d at 205.
120. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
121. Hart, 361 N.C. at 311, 644 S.E.2d at 202.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. See id. at 310, 644 S.E.2d at 202 ("The dissent presents the only issue before this
Court.").
124. Loranger, supra note 105.
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Indeed, the first court of appeals decisions to take account of
the supreme court's opinion in Hart demonstrate that these problems
have not been resolved. On the very same day in June 2007, the court
of appeals filed opinions in both Dogwood Development &
Management Co. v. White Oak Transport Co. 125 and McKinley
Building Corp. v. Alvis. 2 6 In Dogwood, Judge Tyson wrote for the
court and explained that the appellant had violated both Rule
10(c)(1) and Rule 28(b).'27 According to the court, any one of the
appellant's numerous violations standing alone constituted adequate
grounds for dismissal of the appeal." The court acknowledged the
continued vitality of Rule 2 under Hart,'29 but ultimately declined to
excuse the rules violations, and dismissed the appeal.'3 Judge Hunter
filed a dissent in Dogwood, arguing that "when rules violations do not
impede an evaluation of the case on the merits, the appropriate
remedy should not be dismissal, but rather the imposition of
monetary sanctions.''
In McKinley, the court of appeals likewise identified several
violations of the rules pertaining to assignments of error. "2 In fact,
the violations in McKinley were almost identical to those that resulted
in dismissal in Dogwood.3 3  In McKinley, however, the court of
appeals' majority took note of the supreme court's reminder in Hart
that dismissal is not the only available penalty for rules violations."4
Believing that dismissal of the McKinley appeal "would be a step
backward rather than the step forward that Hart asks us to take,"'35
the court elected to impose other sanctions under Rule 34(b) and to
125. _ N.C. App. _, 645 S.E.2d 212 (2007).
126. _ N.C. App. -, 645 S.E.2d 212 (2007).
127. Dogwood, _ N.C. App. at -, 645 S.E.2d at 214-16.
128. Id. at __, 645 S.E.2d at 215-16.
129. Id. at __, 645 S.E.2d at 216.
130. Id. at __, 645 S.E.2d at 217.
131. Id. at __, 645 S.E.2d at 218 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
132. McKinley Bldg. Corp. v. Alvis, - N.C. App.., _, 645 S.E.2d 219, 221 (2007).
133. Compare id. at _, 645 S.E.2d at 225-27 (Tyson, J., dissenting) (using the following
headings to introduce the appellants' rules violations: "Defendants' Assignment of Error
Lacks Clear and Specific Record or Transcript References," "Failure to Refer to the
Assignment of Error in Defendants' Brief," "Failure to Adequately State Grounds for
Appellate Review," and "Failure to Adequately State the Standard of Review"), with
Dogwood, - N.C. App. at __, 645 S.E.2d at 214-16 (using the following headings:
"Assignments of Error Lack Clear and Specific Record or Transcript References,"
"Failure to Refer to the Assignments of Error," "Failure to State Grounds for Appellate
Review," and "Failure to State the Standard of Review").
134. McKinley, - N.C. App. at -, 645 S.E.2d at 222.
135. Id. at __, 645 S.E.2d at 222.
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reach the merits. 36 As in Dogwood, Judge Tyson was part of the
panel deciding McKinley. In the latter case, however, Judge Tyson
was in the minority, offering a dissent in which he reiterated his
opinion that any one of the violations in question was a sufficient
basis for dismissal, ' 37 and then concluded that the circumstances did
not warrant invocation of Rule 2. '38
For the moment, there is no way to be sure which of these
results is more consistent with what the Supreme Court of North
Carolina had in mind when it handed down Hart. Did Judge Tyson
and the Dogwood majority err in concluding that violations of Rule
10(c)(1) and Rule 28(b) warrant dismissal? Or did the majority in
McKinley "create an appeal for the appellant" in considering the
merits of that case? These questions might be answered in the
foreseeable future: by virtue of the dissenting opinions in the court of
appeals, the parties in both Dogwood and McKinley have the right to
appeal to the supreme court.9 Even if the supreme court is asked to
review these cases, however, the uncertainty that remains following
the Hart court's attempt to clarify Viar serves to show that bringing
an end to the controversy surrounding assignments of error through a
series of case-by-case decisions would likely prove to be a long, slow
process.
Resolution of this inconsistency problem by increments is not
the supreme court's only option, however. The court has the power
under the Constitution of North Carolina to amend the Rules of
Appellate Procedure1 40 and can solve the problem by exercising that
power. Continued inconsistency in the application of Viar and of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure should not simply be accepted. The
court of appeals' current schizophrenic application of the rules leaves
136. Id. at __, 645 S.E.2d at 222.
137. Id. at -, 645 S.E.2d at 226-27 (Tyson, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 645 S.E.2d at 228.
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (2005) ("[A]n appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court
from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case ... [i]n which there is a
dissent."). It should be noted that further review of the appellate rules issue is highly
unlikely in McKinley. The appellee is probably satisfied, having prevailed in the court of
appeals. McKinley, - N.C. App. at -, 645 S.E.2d at 225. As for the appellants, the Rules
of Appellate Procedure limit the scope of supreme court review in appeals based solely on
the existence of a dissent in the court of appeals to issues "specifically set out in the
dissenting opinion as the basis for that dissent." N.C. R. APP. P. 16(b). Since Judge Tyson
argued in his McKinley dissent that the appellants' case should have been dismissed,
McKinley, - N.C. App. at -, 645 S.E.2d at 228 (Tyson, J., dissenting), it would be quite
bizarre for the appellants to seek review on the basis of that opinion. In Dogwood, on the
other hand, the appellant may very well challenge the dismissal of its appeal on the basis
of Judge Hunter's dissent.
140. N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 13(2).
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the parties to an appeal to wonder about the scope of the rules and
about how strictly they will be applied. Such unpredictability also
induces parties (appellees in particular) to go to unnecessary expense
to convince the court that the rules should or should not be strictly
applied to their case.' Meanwhile, from the perspective of the court
of appeals, the lack of a coherent standard is a drain on judicial
economy, forcing the court to expend resources in trying to discern a
workable standard on the basis of conflicted case law. Perhaps less
important, though no less valid, is the desire of the court of appeals to
avoid being overturned and rebuked by the supreme court for its
interpretations of a Viar opinion about which reasonable minds can
clearly differ.'42
The most important reason to avoid inconsistency in the
application of the rules, however, is that all parties who come before
North Carolina's appellate courts should be treated equally.'43
Already there have been indications that the Rules of Appellate
Procedure might apply differently based on the type of case at hand.
For example, in Hammonds v. Lumbee River Electric Membership
Corp.,' the court of appeals described the appellants' rules violations
as "troublesome,"' 145 but nonetheless reached the merits because "at
the heart of this case are issues of potential racial discrimination.
141. See, e.g., Youse v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 N.C. App. 187,191-92, 614 S.E.2d 396,
400 (2005) (appellee unsuccessfully argued that appellant's rules violations should result in
dismissal).
142. See, e.g., Davis v. Columbus County Sch., 175 N.C. App. 95, 98, 622 S.E.2d 671,
674 (2005) (stating that the supreme court in Viar "admonished" the court of appeals).
143. The supreme court aptly stated this concern in Hart when it said: "Fundamental
fairness and the predictable operation of the courts for which our Rules of Appellate
Procedure were designed depend upon the consistent exercise of [Rule 2] authority."
State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 317, 644 S.E.2d 201, 206 (2007). The Hart court also noted
that if state procedural rules are not applied consistently, federal courts may not consider
petitioners' failure to abide by those rules to be adequate to preclude habeas review. Id.
The issue of consistency is also of apparent constitutional significance: "[No State shall]
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
144. 178 N.C. App. 1, 631 S.E.2d 1, discretionary review denied, 360 N.C. 576, 635
S.E.2d 598 (2006). The appellants in Hammonds challenged the dismissal of their claims
by the trial court, where they had alleged that the appellee electric cooperative used
racially discriminatory methods to elect its board of directors. Id. at 3-4, 631 S.E.2d at 3-
4.
145. Id. at 15, 631 S.E.2d at 10. The appellants in Hammonds failed to provide any
record or transcript references in conjunction with their initial assignments of error. Id. at
14, 631 S.E.2d at 10. Then, when referring to those assignments of error in their brief, the
appellants simply cited the trial court's order, without challenging any specific findings of
fact or conclusions of law. Id. The court of appeals thus found the appellants in violation
of Rule 10. Id. at 14-15, 631 S.E.2d at 10. The appellants also violated Rule 28(b)(6) in a
manner unrelated to assignments of error. Id. at 15, 631 S.E.2d at 10.
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This Court would not serve the citizens of this State well if it elected
to pass on issues with far-reaching implications." '146 Similarly, in State
v. Hill,'47 the court of appeals considered the merits of an appeal
despite multiple rules violations, due to "the seriousness of [the]
allegations of juror misconduct" at issue. 141 Possible racial
discrimination and juror misconduct are undoubtedly important legal
issues that our courts should resolve whenever circumstances permit.
However, it is safe to assume that the appellants whose cases have
been dismissed as a result of Viar would likewise consider their
appeals to be serious, and the implications of the issues raised to be
far-reaching. Parties' legitimate fears of judicial favoritism (and
judges' fears of being accused thereof) should be allayed by the
imposition of a common, workable standard under which the
procedural aspects of all cases coming before North Carolina's
appellate courts could be judged.
The simplest and surest way to do away with uncertainty and
with discretion would be to demand strict compliance with the Rules
of Appellate Procedure from all parties at all times, and to dismiss
any appeal that fails to satisfy the rules. The repeal of Rule 2 would
accomplish this result by depriving the appellate courts of their ability
to suspend the rules. 149 Strict application of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure would yield predictable results, provide judges with clear
directives on how to handle procedural flaws, and result in equal
treatment of all parties. Such a system would also be quite easy to*
administer, as judges would no longer be required to painstakingly
identify and inventory each of an appellant's rules violations and
argue as to why they do or do not warrant dismissal of the appeal.
Along with these advantages, however, come the inevitable
disadvantages of this extreme solution. Repeal of Rule 2 would place
form above function, requiring the appellate courts to dismiss appeals
even when rules violations have not rendered appellants' arguments
146. Id. at 15, 631 S.E.2d at 10-11.
147. 179 N.C. App. 1, 632 S.E.2d 777 (2006). The Hill appellant contended, inter alia,
that the trial court had erred in failing to declare a mistrial when it became aware that a
juror had violated the court's instruction not to conduct any independent investigation.
Id. at 20, 22, 632 S.E.2d at 789-90.
148. Id. at 21-22, 632 S.E.2d at 790. The court of appeals found the appellant in Hill to
be in violation of Rule 28(b)(6) for failure to cite any legal authority in support of his juror
misconduct argument. Id. at 20, 632 S.E.2d at 789. Although this violation did not directly
relate to assignments of error, Hill nonetheless provides an example of a case in which the
court's decision whether to dismiss for rules violations was influenced by the nature of the
legal issues at stake.
149. N.C. R. App. P. 2.
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unclear to either the court or the appellee. Such a measure would
also mean that the considerations that currently drive Rule 2 would
be lost: "[t]o prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite
decision in the public interest"'5 ° would no longer be among the goals
of the appellate courts when faced with cases involving rules
violations. To date, however, the supreme court has not repealed
Rule 2. Similarly, the court's opinion in Hart confirms that Viar does
not go so far as to say that Rule 2 may no longer be invoked to excuse
violations of the rules for assigning error.' It is thus evident that the
supreme court does not intend unyielding application of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure in this area. This is sound policy in light of the
purposes that assignments of error are intended to serve, because
automatic dismissal for all violations of Rules 10(c) and 25(b) would
not necessarily vindicate those purposes.5 2 The court of appeals'
opinion13  to which the supreme court responded in Hart
demonstrates this point nicely, due to the fact that the court of
appeals seemed to interpret Viar to mean that all violations of the
rules for assigning error must result in dismissal.
154
The appellant in Hart assigned error to the trial court's admission
of certain testimony, arguing that the challenged testimony
" 'constituted an opinion as to an ultimate issue for the jury and a
legal conclusion.' "155 The corresponding argument in the appellant's
brief was that the challenged testimony should not have been
admitted because it was an expression of the witness's opinion that
the appellant was guilty of the offense charged. 156 On this issue, the
court of appeals wrote: "This assignment of error states nothing about
the challenged testimony being impermissible as testimony regarding
[the appellant's] guilt. Accordingly, the underlying assignment of
error does not identify the issue briefed on appeal and is in violation
of [Rule] 10(c)(1)."'' 17  Thus, although this assignment of error
indicated the appellant's contention that the trial court had
150. Id.
151. State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 312-13, 644 S.E.2d 201, 203 (2007); see Viar v. N.C.
Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 401, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 359
N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).
152. See infra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
153. State v. Hart, 179 N.C. App. 30, 633 S.E.2d 102, discretionary review denied, 360
N.C. 651, 637 S.E.2d 182 (2006), affd in part, rev'd in part, 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201
(2007).
154. See id. at 38-39, 633 S.E.2d at 107-08.
155. Id. at 36, 633 S.E.2d at 106 (quoting Record on Appeal at 25, Hart, 179 N.C. App.
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impermissibly admitted opinion testimony, it was deemed insufficient
because it failed to state the exact nature of the opinion that was
allegedly expressed.158
In another assignment of error, the Hart appellant challenged
another portion of the same witness' testimony, and included in his
assignment of error the assertion that admission of the testimony had
violated the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.159 Only in his brief,
however, did the appellant reveal exactly which rule of evidence he
was invoking. 6 ' The court of appeals responded:
Nowhere in [the appellant's] assignment of error does he assign
error on this specific basis; rather, he states generally that the
challenged testimony "otherwise violated the N.C. Rules of
Evidence." Accordingly, this assignment of error is broad,
vague, and unspecific, and it fails to identify the issues on
appeal. Therefore, we do not address this argument because it
is beyond the scope of appellate review.'6 '
It seems that if the appellant had simply included the number of
the rule of evidence that he claimed was violated, this assignment of
error would have been sufficient for the court to consider the issue.'62
In dismissing multiple portions of the appeal, the court of
appeals in Hart did not contend that the appellant's assignments of
error had failed to direct its attention (or the attention of the
appellee) to relevant portions of the record on appeal or the trial
transcript. 163 The majority simply dismissed multiple portions of the
appeal because the appellant's assignments of error stated the legal
bases of some of the issues raised in terms somewhat broader than
were necessary to fully identify the appellant's arguments. It may be
true that the appellant in Hart failed to achieve strict compliance with
Rule 10(c)(1).164 However, it is difficult to imagine a case in which an
158. Id. The extent to which the appellant pursued this line of argument in his brief to
the court is unclear from the court of appeals' majority opinion. It may be that the
appellant offered little actual argument on this point and cited no authority in support of
his position, in which case, even if the argument had been deemed properly within the
scope of appellate review, it would have been considered by the court to be abandoned by
the appellant. N.C. R. APP. P. 28(b)(6). Whatever the case, Judge Hunter did not concern
himself with this assignment of error in his dissent in Hart. See Hart, 179 N.C. App. at 43-
47, 633 S.E.2d at 111-13 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Hart, 179 N.C. App. at 37, 633 S.E.2d at 107.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Record on Appeal, supra note 155, at 25).
162. See id. (declining to address the issue, due entirely to appellant's failure to cite the
specific rule of evidence in question).
163. See id. at 36-39, 633 S.E.2d at 106-08.
164. State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 314-15,644 S.E.2d 201, 204 (2007).
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appellant could possibly come any closer to compliance with the rules
for assigning error without achieving actual compliance.
As discussed above, the case left the court of appeals divided
once again. Judge Calabria was the lone signatory to the opinion she
authored for the court, with Judge Bryant concurring only in the
result. "'65 Judge Hunter, meanwhile, offered a dissent in which he
focused not on the "legal basis" language of Rule 10(C)(1), 166 but
rather on the appellant's compliance with the portion of that rule
stating that " '[a]n assignment of error is sufficient if it directs the
attention of the appellate court to the particular error about which
the question is made, with clear and specific record or transcript
references.' ,167 Judge Hunter worried that the majority's dismissal of
the appellant's arguments "would require appellants to include every
detail of their planned argument in the assignment of error for fear of
dismissal,"'68 and ventured to guess that "[t]o require the automatic
dismissal of all cases for hyper-technicalities was surely not the
intention of our Supreme Court in its decision in Viar. '169
The result reached by the court of appeals in Hart, though
repudiated in part by the supreme court, nonetheless demonstrates
that repeal of Rule 2 would make little sense as far as assignments of
error are concerned. Consider the purposes the court of appeals has
ascribed to assignments of error:
One of the purposes of Rule 10(c) is "to identify for the
appellee's benefit all the errors possibly to be urged on appeal
... so that the appellee may properly assess the sufficiency of
the proposed record on appeal to protect his position." This
rule also enables the appellate court to "fairly and
expeditiously" consider the assignments of error as framed
without "making a voyage of discovery" through the record in
order to determine the legal questions involved. 70
The procedural shortcomings identified by the court of appeals in
Hart did not frustrate either of these purposes. With regard to the
first stated purpose, although the appellant's assignments of error did
165. Hart, 179 N.C. App. at 33, 43, 633 S.E.2d at 105, 111.
166. N.C. R. APP. P. 10(c)(1) ("Each assignment of error shall, so far as practicable, be
confined to a single issue of law; and shall state plainly, concisely and without
argumentation the legal basis upon which error is assigned.").
167. Hart, 179 N.C. App. at 44, 633 S.E.2d at 111 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (alteration in original) (quoting N.C. R. APP. P. 10(c)(1)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 47,633 S.E.2d at 112.
170. Kimmel v. Brett, 92 N.C. App. 331, 335, 374 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1988) (citation
omitted) (quoting N.C. R. APP. P. 10(c) cmt. (1975), reprinted in 287 N.C. 671, 703 (1975)).
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not make perfectly clear the legal bases for his arguments, they left no
doubt as to the factual premises upon which those arguments would
proceed. Both of the assignments of error that the court of appeals
deemed overbroad and insufficient were adequate to at least notify
the appellee that the appellant intended to argue in his brief that
certain testimony had been improperly admitted at trial.17" ' Armed
with this information, the appellee would have been able to examine
the appellant's proposed record on appeal to ensure that the portion
of the trial transcript covering the challenged testimony (as well as
any other information that might be pertinent to the issue) had been
included for possible consideration by the court of appeals.'72
Knowledge of the precise legal theory underlying the appellant's
argument as to why this testimony should not have been admitted
would have been of no help to the appellee in accomplishing this task.
Regarding the second purpose that the court of appeals has
identified for assignments of error, the failure of the appellant's
assignments of error in Hart to identify with perfect specificity the
legal bases for his arguments did not present a significant barrier to
the court's understanding of the legal questions posed. 173  The
assignments of error gave notice of whose testimony was being
challenged, and were even supplemented with direct references to the
trial transcript, meaning that the court could have consulted the
record or transcript and located the challenged evidence without
difficulty.174 In addition, assignments of error are not the court's only
means of determining the legal issues presented by an appellant. The
court also has the benefit of reading the entirety of the appellant's
legal argument as it appears in the appellant's brief.1 75 If an appellant
advances no argument whatsoever in favor of a flawed assignment of
error, then such assignment of error is simply deemed abandoned. 176
However, if the appellee is able to determine the factual basis of the
appellant's argument from the assignments of error, and the court is
able to understand the legal basis of the argument from the
171. See Hart, 179 N.C. App. at 36-37, 633 S.E.2d at 106-07 (revealing that the
appellant's assignments of error succeeded in giving notice of which particular testimony
was being challenged).
172. See N.C. R. APP. P. 9(b)(5) ("On motion of any party the appellate court may
order any portion of the record on appeal or transcript amended to correct error shown as
to form or content.").
173. Hart, 179 N.C. App. at 44-47, 633 S.E.2d at 111-12 (Hunter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
174. See id. at 44, 633 S.E.2d at 111.
175. See generally N.C. R. APP. P. 28 (regarding function and content of briefs).
176. Id. 28(b)(6).
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appellant's brief, there seems to be no rationale for dismissing an
appeal simply because the appellant did not specifically identify legal
arguments in the assignments of error.177 Thus, other than adherence
to an incorrect interpretation of Viar,78 there was no good reason for
the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal in Hart.
If North Carolina's appellate courts are to avoid such senseless
outcomes, they should adopt a different approach. At the opposite
end of the spectrum from unyielding application of the rules
regarding assignments of error would be no application of those rules.
This is a solution that has actually been proposed by at least one
member of the court of appeals. In Broderick v. Broderick,179 the
court of appeals dismissed yet another appeal for the appellant's
failure to comply with Rule 10(c)(1).18° Judge Wynn, once again
unenthusiastically concurring, took the case as an opportunity to
suggest a resolution to the assignments of error problem, writing:
Because dismissing this appeal is mandated by our Supreme
Court's decision in Viar, I most reluctantly join my colleagues
in declining to decide the merits of this appeal.
I write separately to urge our Supreme Court to abolish
assignments of error under [the] North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure ....
In my opinion, the cost of effectively denying our citizens
access to justice in our appellate courts outweighs the benefits of
strictly enforcing the technical requirements for assignments of
error.'18
Judge Wynn went on to list many jurisdictions that do not require
appellants to submit assignments of error, most of which required
assignments of error at one time and later abolished them. 82
177. Cf Kimmel v. Brett, 92 N.C. App. 331, 335, 374 S.E.2d 435,437 (1988) (explaining
the purposes of assignments of error). Note that assignments of error are not necessarily
intended to give notice of an appellant's legal arguments to the appellee. This may be due
to the fact that an appellee has at least thirty days after receiving the appellant's brief to
read it and respond to the legal arguments contained therein. N.C. R. APP. P. 13(a).
178. State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 315, 644 S.E.2d 201, 205 (2007).
179. 175 N.C. App. 501, 623 S.E.2d 806 (2006). The appellant in Broderick sought to
challenge an order modifying his alimony obligations. Id. at 502, 623 S.E.2d at 807.
180. Id. at 503, 623 S.E.2d at 807. The Broderick appellant provided only one
assignment of error, which violated Rule 10(c) by failing to set forth a specific legal basis
for challenging the trial court's order. Id. at 502-03, 623 S.E.2d at 807.
181. Id. at 503-04, 623 S.E.2d at 807-08 (Wynn, J., concurring in the result).
182. Id. at 505, 623 S.E.2d at 808-09 (listing the federal courts generally, the Fourth
Circuit specifically, Alabama, Indiana administrative agencies, Florida, Georgia,
Connecticut, Illinois, and the United States Supreme Court); see also Critics Point to Rule
10 as Root of the Problem, N.C. LAW. WKLY. (Raleigh), May 14, 2007, at 1 (stating that
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Judge Wynn's proposal is an interesting option that would have
several benefits. As Judge Wynn himself noted, abolishing
assignments of error would mean that appellants would have greater
access to the appellate process, since such access would be less
dependent on compliance with formal rules. Relieved of the need to
concern themselves so extensively with form,183 the appellate courts
could employ their resources more fruitfully, determining whether or
not records on appeal and appellants' briefs adequately frame the
legal issues presented, and then applying the law accordingly. Such
new instructions from the supreme court would also enable the court
of appeals to exercise discretion, as the court has shown a tendency to
do since Viar,'" without the embarrassing prospect of possibly
misinterpreting supreme court precedent.
An obvious response to the suggestion of abolishing assignments
of error in North Carolina would be to point to the desirable aspects
of their continued use. As noted earlier, when employed properly,
assignments of error serve at least two useful purposes. First, they
notify appellees of the factual bases for appellants' legal arguments so
that appellees can be sure that adequate factual information is
included in the record on appeal.1 85 Simple abolition of assignments
of error may increase the frequency with which insufficient records
are submitted to the appellate courts. At best, amending such records
would slow the appellate process.1 86  At worst, insufficient records
North Carolina is one of only five jurisdictions that require assignments of error, and that
most of the others interpret their requirements such that most cases are decided on the
merits).
183. The supreme court indicated in Hart that the court of appeals is already not
required to be on the lookout for rules violations. Hart, 361 N.C. at 311, 644 S.E.2d at 202.
However, as noted above, one result of Hart may be that attorneys will bring violations to
the attention of the court more frequently. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying
text. If assignments of error were abolished, there would at least be fewer bases upon
which appellees' lawyers could argue for dismissal.
184. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text. This Recent Development does not
advocate implementing a reasonableness standard as a means of legitimizing preferential
treatment of appellants whose cases the North Carolina appellate courts feel are
particularly "important." Instead, the reasonableness standard should simply be viewed as
a means for the appellate division to relax its enforcement of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure, such that strict compliance with the rules would no longer be
required--even in cases that do not implicate any fundamental purposes of the rules. All
parties bringing appeals before this state's appellate courts should still be treated equally,
and the proposed amendment would help accomplish this by ensuring that all parties
would be subject to a unitary, relatively well-defined standard.
185. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
186. See N.C. R. APP. P. 9(b)(5) (allowing amendment of the record).
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could go unamended and have prejudicial effects upon appellees. 187
A second purpose of assignments of error is to notify the appellate
courts exactly where in the transcript to look for the relevant factual
information, which serves to improve the economy of the appellate
process and to help define appellants' legal contentions.18s Abolition
may force judges to search through records and transcripts in order to
find documentation of the facts upon which appellants base their
arguments. 189
At least one other state that has done away with assignments of
error has addressed the first of these concerns by replacing
assignments of error with a less demanding "declaration of issues."190
In Tennessee, assignments of error have been expressly abolished,
and in their place an appellant must provide a declaration of issues in
tandem with "the appellant's description of the parts of the transcript
he intends to present on appeal."19' The function of this declaration is
simple:
The appellant's declaration need merely advise the appellee of
the issues the appellant intends to present on appeal so that the
appellee can determine whether the parts of the transcript the
appellant intends to order are adequate. If the appellant
misleads the appellee, the latter may seek modification of the
record .... 1 92
Such a change could be instituted in North Carolina's appellate
courts, and the minimal requirements associated with the declaration
of issues would ensure that appellants would not be turned away by
the appellate courts simply because they fail to provide enough
specificity regarding their legal arguments at such an early stage in
the appellate process.193 This change would not do much to answer
concerns about judicial economy, however. Judges would still lack
guidance on where to find the factual information pertinent to the
appeal, and may have to pore over very lengthy trial transcripts in
order to find the documentation they need.
187. An appellant could possibly victimize an unwary appellee by placing in the record
on appeal only the material from trial that is favorable to the appellant's arguments.
188. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
190. See John L. Sobieski, Jr., The Procedural Details of the Proposed Tennessee Rules
of Appellate Procedure, 46 TENN. L. REV. 1, 42 (1978); see also TENN. R. APP. P. 24(a).
191. See Sobieski, supra note 190, at 42; see also TENN. R. APP. P. 24(a).
192. Sobieski, supra note 190, at 43.
193. From the time the clerk of the appellate court mails copies of the record on appeal
to the parties, appellants in North Carolina have at least thirty days in which to develop
the legal arguments they will present to the court. N.C. R. APP. P. 13(a).
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Thus, it makes more sense to attempt to fix only those aspects of
assignments of error that are broken. When the Rules of Appellate
Procedure regarding assignments of error are properly adhered to,
they yield positive results. The problem with strictly requiring such
adherence is that these same positive results can often be achieved, or
at least approximated, without perfect compliance with the rules.
This is particularly evident in those decisions of the court of appeals
that have distinguished Viar where the rules violations did not impede
discernment of the legal issues presented.194 Such cases illustrate that
the court of appeals is averse to applying the rules strictly, and,
indeed, the supreme court itself indicates an inclination to account for
the circumstances of each individual case through the continued
existence and effectiveness of Rule 2. The objective, then, is simply a
more workable standard for determining whether to pardon faulty
assignments of error than the court of appeals has been left to apply
since Viar.
Because the two extreme solutions discussed above are
diametrically opposed, it is impossible to bring together all their
positive aspects. It is possible, however, to formulate a standard that
minimizes the negative. In the absence of clearer direction from the
supreme court, the court of appeals has attempted to articulate an
intermediate standard of its own. In Hammonds v. Lumbee River
Electric Membership Corp.,19 the court wrote:
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Viar, this Court has
not treated violations of the Rules as grounds for automatic
dismissal. Instead, the Court has weighed (1) the impact of the
violations on the appellee, (2) the importance of upholding the
integrity of the Rules, and (3) the public policy reasons for
reaching the merits in a particular case. We will conduct the
same analysis here.'96
This weighing of the various circumstances of a particular case
requires a good deal of subjective judgment, and, as noted above,
excessive judicial discretion is undesirable. 97 Another problem with
this analysis is that it is unnecessarily complicated. Fortunately, there
already exists within the competence of the judiciary another
standard that is simpler, and which avoids a good deal of the
194. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
195. 178 N.C. App. 1, 631 S.E.2d 1, discretionary review denied, 360 N.C. 576, 635
S.E.2d 598 (2006).
196. Id. at 15, 631 S.E.2d at 10.
197. See supra notes 40-69, 125-38 and accompanying text (detailing cases in which
substantially similar rules violations have yielded different outcomes).
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subjectivity with which the court of appeals has been deciding cases
involving violations of the rules regarding assignments of error. 98
This Recent Development urges the Supreme Court of North
Carolina to exercise the rulemaking authority granted to it by the
Constitution of North Carolina 99 to amend Rules 10(c) and 28(b) of
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure2° by adding to each
a proviso that states, at least in substance: "Insofar as it relates to
assignments of error, this subsection shall be suspended pursuant to
Rule 2 if, and only if, the legal issue presented by the party assigning
error is reasonably identifiable in a brief filed with the appellate
division by that party. ' 201
Before weighing the pros and cons of this proposed solution,
some illustration of how it would operate is in order. This can be
198. See infra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
199. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2).
200. As an alternative to amending the rules, the supreme court could achieve much
the same effect by laying out this new standard in an opinion of the court. This Recent
Development recommends amending the rules for multiple reasons. First, the Rules of
Appellate Procedure are likely among the first sources of authority consulted by any party
to a case that reaches North Carolina's appellate division, since they
govern procedure in all appeals from the courts of the trial division to the courts of
the appellate division; in appeals in civil and criminal cases from the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court; in direct appeals from administrative agencies,
boards, and commissions to the appellate division; and in applications to the courts
of the appellate division for writs and other relief which the courts or judges
thereof are empowered to give.
N.C. R. APP. P. 1(a). Also, the supreme court has quasi-legislative authority in
establishing rules of procedure for the appellate courts, and therefore need not wait until
another case involving violations of Rules 10(c) and 28(b) comes before it to establish the
proposed change. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2). For discussion of the justifications for
the court's authority to establish its own rules, see generally Amanda G. Ray, Recent
Development, The Supreme Court of North Carolina's Rulemaking Authority and the
Struggle for Power. State v. Tutt, 84 N.C. L. REV. 2100 (2006).
201. The word "shall" is used because, in order for the amendments to have their
intended curative effects, suspension of Rules 10(c) and 28(b) must be mandatory with
regard to all issues that are reasonably identifiable in appellants' briefs. If the application
of Rule 2 in such circumstances were instead left to the courts' discretion, the amendment
would do little to alleviate the concern over excessive judicial subjectivity. See supra notes
143-48 and accompanying text. The phrase "Insofar as it relates to assignments of error"
is used in order to preserve unaffected those provisions of Rule 28(b) that are unrelated to
assignments of error, such as the requirement that the standard of review applicable to
each question presented be stated in the appellant's brief.
A word is in order here regarding the supreme court's reminder in Hart that dismissal
is not the only sanction available when the appellate courts are faced with rules violations.
State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 311, 644 S.E.2d 201, 202 (2007). Even in cases where the
"reasonably identifiable" standard is satisfied, there is nothing in the proposed
amendment that precludes the imposition of sanctions less severe than dismissal. To make
this clear, explicit language to that effect could be included in the amendment.
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accomplished by way of a hypothetical: imagine, for example, that the
proposed amendment had been in effect at the time Viar came before
the court of appeals. The appellant in Viar violated Rule 10(c)(1) by
neglecting to number his assignments of error and by failing to
provide specific references to the portions of the transcript or record
upon which those assignments of error were based.2 °" Since the
appellant failed to comply with one of the rules pertaining to
assignments of error, the amendment would be triggered, and the
next step would be to read the appellant's brief in order to determine
whether the appellant's argument renders any legal issues reasonably
identifiable. With regard to any such issues, the amendment would
mandate that Rule 2 be invoked to excuse the appellant's violations
of Rule 10(c). Any issues not reasonably identifiable after
considering the appellant's brief, on the other hand, would have to be
dismissed.
The record on appeal in Viar contained two assignments of
error.2°3 The first of these dealt with the North Carolina Industrial
Commission's refusal to admit certain deposition testimony at trial.2"
The appellant's brief did not pursue this line of argument, however,0 5
and so even with the proposed amendment in place, this issue would
be deemed abandoned under Rule 28(b)(6).2 6 The appellant's
second assignment of error read as follows:
"The North Carolina Industrial Commission, in its majority
opinion, committed reversible error by not finding the named
respondents negligent in the deaths of the minor petitioners for
not installing median barriers on a deadly stretch of Highway I-
85 after the Department of Transportation found an acute need
for the barriers approximately 8 years earlier.""2 7
The appellant then argued in his brief "that the Industrial
Commission erred by failing to find that the NCDOT's negligence in
not installing median barriers in the section of 1-85 where the accident
202. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 401, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (per curiam),
reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).
203. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 162 N.C. App. 362, 377, 590 S.E.2d 909, 920 (2004)
(Tyson, J., dissenting), vacated, 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360 (per curiarn), reh'g denied,
359 N.C. 643,617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 379, 590 S.E.2d at 921.
206. N.C. R. APP. P. 28(b)(6).
207. Viar, 162 N.C. App. at 377, 590 S.E.2d at 920 (Tyson, J., dissenting) (quoting
Record on Appeal at 77, Viar, 162 N.C. App. 362, 590 S.E.2d 909 (2004) (No. COA03-
25)).
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occurred was the proximate cause of the decedents' death. 2 °8 In its
Viar opinion, the supreme court held that in reaching the merits of
this issue, the court of appeals impermissibly "addressed the issue, not
raised or argued by [the appellant], which was the basis of the
Industrial Commission's decision, namely, the reasonableness of [the
department's] decision to delay installation of the median barriers. ' 21
It may be true that the appellant in Viar did not technically argue that
the Department of Transportation's failure to install median barriers
along the stretch of 1-85 where Megan and Macey Viar were killed
satisfied North Carolina's legal definition of negligence, in that he did
not explicitly contend that the department breached a duty of care
owed to Megan and Macey. 210 Despite this technical shortcoming,
however, the argument the appellant presented in his brief succeeded
in making the legal issue he was arguing reasonably identifiable:
namely, that the Industrial Commission erred in failing to conclude
that the Department of Transportation was liable for actionable
negligence.2 11 Thus, with the proposed amendment in place, it would
have been not only permissible, but mandatory, for the court of
appeals in Viar to consider the merits and render judgment on this
issue. 12
This amendment would leave the rules pertaining to assignments
of error in effect, encouraging appellants to continue to abide by
those rules and thereby continuing to foster the positive
consequences that properly presented assignments of error bring. 13
Meanwhile, even in cases of improperly presented assignments of
error, a reasonableness standard would still be responsive to the
reasons for which assignments of error are desirable in the first place.
As the court of appeals' majority opinion in State v. Hart214 explained,
"[t]he purpose of assignments of error is to limit the scope of the
appeal, and to put the other party on notice of the issues to be
208. Id. at 363, 590 S.E.2d at 912 (majority opinion).
209. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (per curiam),
reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).
210. Viar, 162 N.C. App. at 369, 590 S.E.2d at 915 (stating the elements of actionable
negligence in North Carolina).
211. "To establish actionable negligence, plaintiff must show that: (1) defendant failed
to exercise due care in the performance of some legal duty owed to plaintiff under the
circumstances; and (2) the negligent breach of such duty was the proximate cause of the
injury." Id.
212. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 170, 185, 188 and accompanying text.
214. 179 N.C. App. 30, 633 S.E.2d 102, discretionary review denied, 360 N.C. 651, 637
S.E.2d 182 (2006), affid in part, rev'd in part, 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201 (2007).
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presented.,215 Skeptics of the proposed standard might contend that
requiring substantive consideration of any issues that can reasonably
be identified in appellants' briefs will broaden the scope of appeals
and place a great burden on the appellate courts.2 6  In reality,
however, the reasonableness standard would simply give greater
definition to the outer limits of the scope of appellate review. If the
court is unable to identify an appellant's argument after examining
the assignments of error and the appellant's brief, then that appellant
has failed the reasonableness test, and the unidentifiable argument
must be dismissed. Thus, a reasonableness standard would actually
thwart the problem the supreme court sought to prevent in Viar when
it stated that "[i]t is not the role of the appellate courts ... to create
an appeal for an appellant. 2 17  The appellate division would be
required to dismiss any issue truly "not raised or argued, 21'8 by an
appellant.
Imposing a reasonableness standard would also have no
detrimental effect on the notice that the opposing party receives
regarding the issues to be presented. Because the proposed
amendment focuses on what is ascertainable from the appellant's
brief, it may seem that the appellee will be left with no way of
ensuring that the record on appeal-which is submitted to the court
in advance of the appellant's brief29 -contains the necessary factual
documentation. However, the change to Rules 10(c) and 28(b) would
have no effect upon Rule 9(b)(5), which allows any appellate court to
order amendment of a deficient record on appeal "[o]n motion of any
215. Id. at 37, 633 S.E.2d at 107 (citation omitted) (citing Broderick v. Broderick, 175
N.C. App. 501, 503, 623 S.E.2d 806, 807 (2006)).
216. E.g., id. at 37-38, 633 S.E.2d at 107 (arguing that, if the court of appeals were to
accept an assignment of error that broadly asserted that the trial court had violated the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence, the court would thereby "allow [the appellant's]
counsel to argue on appeal any and every violation of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence"). While it is true that the more lenient reasonableness standard might allow
appellants to argue a greater range of issues than is currently possible, the proposed
amendment would have no effect on Rule 28(j)(2), which prescribes limitations for the
length of briefs filed with the North Carolina Court of Appeals. N.C. R. APP. P. 28(j)(2).
Of course, parties under the proposed standard might simply attempt to fit as many issues
as possible within the length limitations. Cursory arguments would, however, risk failing
the reasonableness inquiry. For example, a mere citation to a past case or a statute,
without sufficient explanation of how it bears upon the appeal at hand, would probably
fail to reasonably identify any issues.
217. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (per curiam),
reh'g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).
218. Id.
219. See supra note 193.
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party or on its own initiative.""22 Thus, regardless of whether the
court will actually decide to reach the merits of all the issues
presented in an appellant's brief, the appellee is already empowered
to make certain that the record on appeal is sufficient with respect to
all such issues. Under the proposed standard, the appellee could also
look to the appellant's brief for guidance on which issues to argue in
the appellee's own brief, with the knowledge that the court will
decide upon all issues that can reasonably be identified in the
appellant's brief.
Another beneficial aspect of the reasonableness standard is that
it would be easily applied by the courts. First of all, reasonableness is
a familiar standard that is already applied in many judicial contexts.22'
More importantly, a unitary standard would allow the court of
appeals to take a well-defined approach to all cases in which the rules
for assigning error have been violated. The court would be relieved
of the difficult task of trying to elucidate the "creating an appeal"
standard by synthesizing the inconsistent case law that has developed
under Viar and Hart. This would simplify the decision of whether or
not to reach the merits of an appeal and thus allow the court to
devote its time to straightforward substantive analysis. Along those
same lines, parties would have less incentive to attempt to persuade
the appellate courts that issues should be either considered or
dismissed, and would thus be encouraged to focus on substantive
rather than procedural issues. The more definite standard would give
parties less procedural ambiguity to work with, and therefore less
room to offer novel interpretations of precedent. A determination of
reasonableness would also involve less judicial discretion than is
implicated under the various standards the court of appeals has
recently applied. For example, a determination of reasonableness
would-at least on its face-require less subjectivity than a balancing
of the public policy implications of a particular appeal against the
importance of upholding the Rules of Appellate Procedure.22
The proposed standard is also preferable to the confusing
sequence of inquiries that might be necessary under the supreme
220. N.C. R. APP. P. 9(b)(5).
221. See, e.g., MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN
EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCrION OF THE OBJEcTIVE STANDARD 1 (2003) (noting the
use of the "reasonable person" standard in tort law, criminal law, contract law, and
administrative law, and describing such standards as "ubiquitous").
222. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., 178 N.C. App. 1,
15, 631 S.E.2d 1, 10-11, discretionary review denied, 360 N.C. 576, 635 S.E.2d 598 (2006)
(concluding that it was more important to address the substantive issues in the case at bar
than to uphold "the integrity of the Rules").
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court's decision in Hart. As noted above, Hart leaves a number of
important questions unanswered.223  In terms of judicial economy, it
would be significantly more efficient for a court to engage in a single
reasonableness inquiry than it would be for the court to conduct a
series of relatively difficult analyses. For that matter, a
reasonableness analysis would likely be easier than trying to ascertain
which analyses are even necessary under Hart. Moreover, each of the
questions left unanswered by Hart provides a separate ground for the
exercise of judicial discretion, and the difficulty of the questions
makes such discretion all the more necessary.22' By contrast, a
reasonableness inquiry, though it would not entirely eliminate judges'
discretion, would call for a relatively simple and distinct analysis. For
example, deciding whether an appeal implicates any fundamental
purpose of the Rules of Appellate Procedure would require more
subjective judgment than would a decision about whether an issue is
reasonably identifiable within a party's brief. Whereas a court
considering fundamental purpose must make a policy judgment
223. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
224. Take, for example, the possible inquiry into whether a case implicates any
fundamental purpose of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. This question might be
described as requiring the exercise of "strong discretion," which "can be defined as the
possibility to choose among different equally valid or legally admissible courses of action."
MARISA IGLESIAS VILA, FACING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 6 (2001). There is, after all, no
settled norm as to precisely what constitutes a fundamental purpose of the appellate rules.
Because cases requiring strong discretion present judges with a variety of legitimate
approaches, "decisions that result from the exercise of strong discretion are
unpredictable." Ricardo Caracciolo, Discretion, Right Answers and the Judicial Function
IV-88 (Seminar in Latin America on Constitutional and Political Theory 2000), available
at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Caracciolo-Discretion-RightAnswers-and_
theJudicialFunction.pdf.
On the other hand, one might argue that the questions left open by Hart
necessitate only "weak discretion," which "refers to those situations in which, although
law offers an answer to the case under consideration, this answer is not obvious. A
complex intellectual process is necessary to identify the course of action prescribed by the
law." IGLESIAS VILA, supra, at 5. Such an argument would contend that the fundamental
purpose standard itself holds the correct answer, and that courts must simply use good
judgment in order to arrive at that answer.
Regardless of how one characterizes the fundamental purpose inquiry, some form
of "complex intellectual process" is needed to arrive at an answer, due to the fact that it is
not obvious what constitutes a fundamental purpose of the rules. See id. "[W]hen it is the
case that semantic rules are indeterminate ... the interpreter [is] granted the freedom to
choose between open alternatives." Id. at 46. Due to the high level of semantic
indeterminacy in the standards that might apply under Hart, a judge employing those
standards would have significant freedom of choice, which would lead to unpredictable
results. Meanwhile, given that reasonableness standards are particularly well developed,
see supra note 221 and accompanying text, one would expect such standards to be better
defined, and thus to require a weaker form of judicial discretion, resulting in more
predictable outcomes.
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regarding the ultimate importance of the issues it might address, a
court considering reasonableness must simply focus on the qualities
of the particular appeal at hand.
In the same vein, the relative simplicity of a reasonableness
inquiry would leave less room for inconsistency than would the more
complicated inquiry outlined in Hart. This is important because, as
the supreme court itself stated in Hart, "[f]undamental fairness and
the predictable operation of the courts for which our Rules of
Appellate Procedure were designed depend upon the consistent
exercise of [Rule 2] authority."225
Another interesting observation regarding the proposed
amendment in light of Hart is that, although the Hart court suggested
that the court of appeals consider imposing sanctions other than
dismissal when the appellate rules are violated, the reasonableness
standard may provide greater opportunity to do so than the standard
that exists after Hart. If it is the case that Rule 2 must be invoked in
order to reach the merits of any appeal that violates the rules,
regardless of the form of sanction the court chooses to impose, then
the fundamental purpose inquiry will force dismissal of most flawed
cases-including those in which the court would have chosen more
lenient sanctions.226 If the proposed reasonableness standard were
applied, on the other hand, dismissal would be much less likely. The
appellate courts would be free to impose any lesser sanctions deemed
appropriate, and to then proceed to the merits.227
A reasonableness standard would also do more than Hart to
encourage both the parties and the appellate courts to focus more on
appeals' substantive merit, rather than on the parties' ability to
comply with procedural rules that are obviously difficult to satisfy.'
Attorneys would have less incentive to point out procedural miscues,
since it would likely be more difficult for an appellee to convince a
court that an issue is not reasonably identifiable in an appellant's
brief than it would be to convince the court that dismissal is
appropriate under Hart. This is true regardless of which
225. State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309,317, 644 S.E.2d 201,206 (2007).
226. See supra notes 100-03, 108-11 and accompanying text.
227. Although the proposed amendment would require suspension of the rules for
assigning error with regard to any reasonably identifiable issues, the change would not
preclude the appellate courts from imposing sanctions less than dismissal. See supra note
201 and accompanying text.
228. See Loranger, supra note 105 (stating that in the twenty months after the supreme
court handed down Viar, "the Court of Appeals cited Viar in 124 separate cases: 50 of
those were dismissed outright, and 29 were partially dismissed"). If the appellate rules
were easy to follow, one would not expect Viar to come up nearly so often.
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interpretation of Hart is the correct one. Recall that if Rule 2 must be
invoked to reach the merits of any appeal that fails to achieve
compliance with the appellate rules, then a court's decision whether
or not to reach the merits will usually depend upon a fundamental
purpose inquiry.229 Given that fundamental purposes of the appellate
rules are rarely implicated,2 3° it would probably be easier to convince
the court in a given case that no such purpose is at stake than it would
be to demonstrate that the appellant's brief fails to reasonably
identify the issues on appeal. If, on the other hand, imposition of
lesser sanctions removes Rule 2 from consideration, then the decision
will still hinge on a subjective standard, such as whether or not the
court would have to "create an appeal for the appellant" in order to
consider the merits of the appeal. Again, it would likely be easier to
convince a court not to reach the merits under such an indefinite
standard than it would be to show that the appellant's brief does not
reasonably identify any issues. The courts themselves, meanwhile,
would have to consider the substantive content of parties' briefs in
order to determine which issues are reasonably identifiable. These
inquiries would have more of a substantive focus than, for example,
attempts to determine whether the assignments of error provided a
sufficient forecast of an appellant's arguments.
Naturally, there are also a number of criticisms that could be
aimed at this proposed change. First, any amendment that claims to
leave rules in effect, and yet results in some reduction of their
efficacy, could encourage parties to ignore those rules. The
imposition of a reasonableness standard, however-unlike a full
abolition of assignments of error-would preserve parties' incentives
to take the rules seriously. Even aided by the protection of the
reasonableness standard, appellants would still be well advised to be
as persuasive as possible by making clear legal arguments and by
ensuring that the court can discover and understand the factual bases
of those arguments. Likewise, appellees would still have just as much
incentive as before to offer well-argued responses and to provide
their own bases for those arguments.
Another critique of the reasonableness standard is that it fails to
truly solve some of the most serious problems that exist under Viar
and Hart. Since reasonableness is a pliable standard, parties would
still be unable to define with certainty the necessary level of
compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure regarding
229. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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assignments of error. Also, since a reasonableness standard can be
manipulated, unwarranted judicial discretion would remain a
concern.231  Imposition of the reasonableness standard would,
however, result in less uncertainty than currently characterizes the
application of the rules for assigning error. Presently, the extent to
which the court of appeals will require compliance with the rules in
any given case seems to depend upon which judge is selected to
author the opinion. 2  With a clear reasonableness standard in place,
at least parties would have a better conception of the basic criterion
against which their compliance would be judged.
The reasonableness standard is admittedly not a panacea. It is,
however, an explicit and objective standard that avoids the drawbacks
of more extreme solutions to the problems plaguing the use of
assignments of error in North Carolina.233  Had such a test been
applied to the appeal brought by Claude Viar on behalf of his
daughters, the appellate division probably would not have dismissed
the case.234 Instead, the courts would have been free to consider the
merits of the claim, and the State of North Carolina may eventually
have been required to bear some responsibility for the auto accident
at issue. 235  The tragic facts of his case may cast Mr. Viar as a
particularly sympathetic appellant, but that has no bearing upon
whether or not his case should have been heard. All appellants,
regardless of circumstance, should be treated honestly and equally by
the courts. 236 The facts of Viar do, however, serve as a reminder of
the substantial rights at stake in North Carolina's appellate courts,
and thus speak in favor of greater clarity and certainty in the law.
Justice was not well served when the Supreme Court of North
Carolina dismissed Viar's appeal on the basis of harmless technical
faults, nor has it been served by the court of appeals' inconsistent
handling of subsequent cases. Unfortunately, the supreme court's
opinion in Hart has failed to solve the problem of inconsistency.
231. MORAN, supra note 221, at 281-82.
232. Loranger, supra note 105 (quoting the attorney for the Office of the Appellate
Defender who argued Hart before the supreme court as follows: " 'I think [Viar] created a
state of panic within the appellate bar. You were giving it your best shot, and you thought
you were complying with the rules. But depending on what panel [of the court of appeals]
you got, you could have your case dismissed.' "). As demonstrated above, Hart appears to
have failed to solve the inconsistency problem. See supra notes 125-38 and accompanying
text.
233. See supra notes 149-50, 179-89 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 202-12 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 7, 32 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, amendment of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure to include a reasonableness standard with regard to
assignments of error would establish a sensible and coherent basis for
granting access to the appellate courts, and thus would result in better
administration of justice in North Carolina.
STEPHEN D. THILL**
** With love and gratitude to my grandfathers, Frank Kolakowski and Donald Thill.
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WILLIAM PATRICK MURPHY, B.A., LL.B., J.S.D., Henry Brandis Professor of Law Emeritus
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